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 NOTE 
Evaluating the Special Needs Doctrine in the 
Context of Higher Education 
Ryan Prsha* 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
On June 17, 2011, Linn State Technical College1 adopted a drug-testing 
policy that read as follows: 
Linn State Technical College will begin a drug screening program in 
the fall semester . . . for students who are newly classified as degree or 
certificate seeking and degree or certificate seeking students returning 
after one or more semesters of non-enrollment at the Linn State Tech-
nical College campus or any Linn State Technical College location.2 
Never before had a public college or university in the United States im-
plemented a mandatory school-wide drug-screening policy such as this.3  
Each and every incoming student was to be tested, and those who failed the 
test or refused its administration were to have their college admission with-
 
* B.S., University of Missouri, 2014; J.D. Candidate, University of Missouri School 
of Law, 2017; Note & Comment Editor, Missouri Law Review, 2016–2017.  Special 
thanks to Professor Brad Desnoyer for his guidance throughout the writing process 
and to my family for their continued support. 
 1. Linn State is a hands-on trade school that prepares its students to enter the 
workforce in one of a wide range of potential careers.  Programs, STATE TECHNICAL 
C. MO., https://www.statetechmo.edu/programs/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).  Because 
of the inherent nature of some of these careers, a portion of the students enrolled learn 
how to operate heavy machinery and handle dangerous materials.  Kittle-Aikeley v. 
Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated (Feb. 18, 2016).  It is worth 
noting that in 2014, “Linn State Technical College” became the State Technical Col-
lege of Missouri (“STCM”).  History, STATE TECHNICAL C. MO., 
https://www.statetechmo.edu/history/ (last visited Jan. 17, 2017).  However, because 
the Eighth Circuit opinions still refer to the school as “Linn State,” this Note will do 
so as well. 
 2. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 917 (quoting Drug Screening, STATE TECHNICAL 
C. MO., https://eagleonline.statetechmo.edu/ICS/Drug_Screening.jnz (last visited Jan. 
17, 2017)). 
 3. Timothy Williams, At One College, a Fight over Required Drug Tests, N.Y. 
TIMES (Oct. 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/10/11/us/at-linn-state-
technical-a-fight-over-required-drug-tests.html?_r=0. 
1
Prsha: Evaluating the Special Needs Doctrine
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 2016
1242 MISSOURI LAW REVIEW [Vol. 81 
drawn.4  Unsurprisingly, members of the Linn State student body were trou-
bled by this policy and filed suit against the college.5 
While the case law governing school drug-testing policies is fairly well 
developed,6 this dispute marked the first time that the reasonable privacy 
expectation of college students had been scrutinized in such a fashion.7  The 
issue is polarizing, and the lawsuit against Linn State was handled inconsist-
ently at various levels of the judicial system.8  The manner in which the case 
was handled will likely have broad and lasting implications on the privacy 
rights of college students throughout the country, not only regarding drug 
testing, but also in other aspects of the standard higher education experience. 
Part II of this Note discusses the legal context in which this issue must 
be framed and gives a brief history of how the courts have handled public 
school drug-testing policies to this point.  Part III examines the current state 
of drug testing in the academic setting – specifically focusing on the ongoing 
legal situation at Linn State.  Part IV delves into questions concerning the 
Eighth Circuit’s current treatment of the Linn State situation, as well as the 
potential approaches that the judiciary could take in future cases. 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
This Part will first review the intricacies of the Fourth Amendment’s 
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures.  It will then discuss the 
special needs exception to the Fourth Amendment’s warrant requirement and 
how that exception has been applied to mandatory drug-testing policies. 
 
 4. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 917–18. 
 5. See id. at 918. 
 6. See id. at 920 (outlining Supreme Court cases that addressed student drug 
policies in primary schools). 
 7. See id. at 920–21 (“The current matter is a hybrid of [] two lines of cases, so 
while they are informative they are not wholly dispositive and ultimately do not alter 
the analysis that must be conducted . . . .”); Williams, supra note 3 (“Linn State is the 
first public college in the country to require all adult students to submit to mandatory 
drug tests.”). 
 8. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 916–17; Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315, 
318 (8th Cir. 2013) (vacating the district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction in 
the facial challenge of the policy); Barrett v. Claycomb, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1137 
(W.D. Mo. 2013) (finding policy constitutional as applied to students in certain pro-
grams), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th 
Cir. 2015), and aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v. 
Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Barrett v. Claycomb, No. 11-cv-
04242-NKL, 2011 WL 5827783, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Jan. 29, 2011) (issuing a prelimi-
nary injunction as to the facial challenge of the policy), order vacated, 705 F.3d 315 
(8th Cir. 2013). 
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A.  The Fourth Amendment and Its Special Needs Doctrine 
The Fourth Amendment is an important, yet controversial, pillar of the 
U.S. legal system.9  By protecting against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
the doctrine establishes an essential limitation on government power.10  In 
order for the government to search or seize an individual’s “person[], house[], 
papers, [or] effects,” it must first show probable cause11 and obtain a war-
rant.12  If probable cause and a warrant are present, then the search is consid-
ered reasonable, and the amendment affords no protection to the individual.13 
While this rule appears reasonably straightforward, there are a number 
of exceptions to the warrant requirement that create an aura of confusion in 
its practical application.  One of these exceptions requires no warrant, re-
quires no probable cause, and is potentially unlimited in scope: the special 
needs doctrine.14 
 
 9. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY & LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
INVESTIGATION 31 (2d ed. 2013) (“No technique of law enforcement is more im-
portant than the ability of the police to search for evidence and the ability of the po-
lice to seize what they find and to arrest individuals suspected of criminal activity.  
No aspect of criminal procedure has produced more Supreme Court decisions or aris-
es more frequently in the lower courts.”). 
 10. It is important to note that the Fourth Amendment is only implicated if the 
government or someone acting on the government’s behalf is performing the search.  
Id. at 10 (“The Bill of Rights protects individuals against the power of the State. . . . 
The Fourth Amendment is the key constitutional provision governing police conduct 
during searches and seizures.”).  The Fourth Amendment provides no protection 
against unreasonable searches conducted by private individuals; this is known as the 
state action doctrine.  ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW PRINCIPLES AND 
POLICIES 519 (4th ed. 2011). 
 11. Probable cause essentially means that there is a fair probability or substantial 
chance that evidence of a crime will be found.  Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238–
39 (1983).  More specifically, probable cause to search for or to seize evidence re-
quires that an officer is possessed of sufficient facts and circumstances as would lead 
a reasonable person to believe that evidence or contraband relating to criminal activity 
will be found in the location to be searched.  Id.  Likewise, probable cause to make an 
arrest exists when an officer has knowledge of such facts as would lead a reasonable 
person to believe that a particular individual is committing, has committed, or is about 
to commit a criminal act.  Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 n.2 (2003) (citing 
Brinegar v. United States, 388 U.S. 160, 175–76 (1949)). 
 12. Specifically, the Fourth Amendment provides “[t]he right of the people to be 
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, 
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, 
and the persons or things to be seized.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  In general, a war-
rant must be issued by a neutral magistrate, supported by an oath or affirmation, and 
state with particularity the place to be searched.  CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra 
note 9, at 111–12. 
 13. CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note 9, at 111–12. 
 14. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987). 
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The special needs doctrine recognizes certain instances when “special 
needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and 
probable-cause requirement impracticable.”15  Such instances include admin-
istrative searches,16 searches at border crossings17 and checkpoints,18 searches 
in jails and prisons,19 searches of arrestees,20 and certain drug-testing poli-
cies.21  The litigation that surrounds drug testing at public colleges and uni-
versities has focused specifically on the drug-testing portion of the special 
needs exception. 
B.  The Drug Test 
Courts have long recognized that the administration of a drug test by an 
agent of the government amounts to a “search” under the Fourth Amend-
ment.22  Therefore, any time a drug test is administered by or on behalf of the 
government, it must be conducted under the reasonableness standard.23  Alt-
hough this standard generally specifies a need for probable cause and a war-
rant, suspicionless drug-testing policies have been deemed acceptable under 
the special needs exception in three contexts: the workplace, public schools, 
and hospitals.24 
 
 15. Id. at 873 (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985) 
(Blackmun, J., concurring)). 
 16. See Camara v. Mun. Court of City & Cty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 535 (1967) 
(stating that “‘probable cause’ to issue a warrant to inspect must exist if reasonable 
legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied 
with respect to a particular dwelling”).  See also New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 
693 (1987) (finding a warrantless search of an automobile junkyard falls within the 
exception of the warrant requirement for administrative inspections of “pervasively 
regulated industries”). 
 17. See United States v. Flores-Montano, 541 U.S. 149, 155 (2004) (concluding 
“the Government’s authority to conduct suspicionless inspections at the border in-
cludes the authority to remove, disassemble, and reassemble a vehicle’s fuel tank”). 
 18. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (conclud-
ing sobriety checkpoints do not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 19. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders of Cty. of Burlington, 132 S. Ct. 
1510, 1513–14 (2012) (holding “courts must defer to the judgment of correctional 
officials unless the record contains substantial evidence showing their policies are an 
unnecessary or unjustified response to problems of jail security”). 
 20. See Maryland v. King, 133 S. Ct. 1958, 1980 (2012) (concluding “DNA 
identification of arrestees is a reasonable search that can be considered part of a rou-
tine booking procedure”). 
 21. See Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 659–66 (1995) (holding 
the warrantless drug testing of students who voluntarily participate in high school 
athletics does not violate the Fourth Amendment). 
 22. Id. at 652, 653–54. 
 23. Id. at 652. 
 24. CHEMERINSKY & LEVENSON, supra note 9, at 257.  This falls under the “spe-
cial needs” warrant exception.  Id.  The underlying theory is that drug use is a signifi-
4
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This exception was first recognized in the area of government employ-
ment.25  In Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives’ Ass’n, the Supreme Court of 
the United States upheld federal regulations requiring railroad workers who 
were involved in accidents to be drug tested.26  In this case, the Court was 
clear that there was a “special need” to ensure the safety of the traveling pub-
lic.27  Further, the fact that the tested employees worked in “an industry that 
is regulated pervasively to ensure safety” created a diminished expectation of 
privacy.28  Therefore, the government’s special need to ensure safety for its 
passengers justified the abrogation of a citizen’s Fourth Amendment protec-
tion from blood tests.29 
This rationale was also used in National Treasury Employees Union v. 
Von Raab.30  In Von Raab, the Court upheld a U.S. Customs Service policy 
that required drug testing for any customs worker who was to hold a job in 
which firearms or drugs were present.31  Unlike in Skinner, there was no rea-
son to suspect that the individuals being tested in this case were using 
drugs.32  Nonetheless, the Court believed that there was still a special need to 
make sure that any employee who carried weapons or investigated drug traf-
ficking did not use drugs himself or herself.33  This special need was suffi-
cient to justify a suspicionless search.34 
The extent of the holdings in Skinner and Von Raab was finally limited 
eight years later in Chandler v. Miller.35  In this case, the Supreme Court 
struck down a statute requiring all candidates running for political office to 
pass a drug test.36  The Court found no special need because (1) there was “no 
evidence of a drug problem among . . . elected officials,” (2) “those officials 
typically d[id] not perform high risk, safety-sensitive tasks, and” (3) “the 
required certification immediately aid[ed] no interdiction effort[s].”37  Alt-
hough drug use calls into question “an official’s judgment and integrity[] . . . 
and undermines public confidence and trust in elected officials,” the Court 
was clear that no special need could be found absent some “indication of a 
 
cant problem, and there is a special need to make sure that certain individuals in cer-
tain situations are drug free – this special need overrides the typically essential Fourth 
Amendment reasonableness protections.  See id. 
 25. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 633–34 (1989). 
 26. Id. at 634. 
 27. Id. at 620–21. 
 28. Id. at 627. 
 29. Id. at 634. 
 30. 489 U.S. 656, 678–79 (1989). 
 31. Id. at 674. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. 
 35. 520 U.S. 305 (1997). 
 36. Id. at 323. 
 37. Id. at 321–22. 
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concrete danger demanding departure from the Fourth Amendment’s main 
rule.”38 
It was not until Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton in 1995 that the 
special needs exception was extended to cover drug testing in public 
schools.39  In Acton, the Court held a public school may implement a suspi-
cionless drug test as long as the school has a legitimate interest in doing so 
and the test is not too intrusive.40  Although the “ultimate measure of the con-
stitutionality of a governmental search is ‘reasonableness,’” courts handling 
the tolerability of warrantless drug testing in public schools have used three 
factors in guiding their decisions.41 
1.  Nature of the Privacy Interest 
Courts first examine the nature of the privacy interest upon which the 
search at issue intrudes.42  The greater the privacy interest, the less likely it is 
that a suspicionless drug test will be found reasonable.43  It is well accepted 
that the inherent custodial responsibility schools possess over their pupils 
creates a lesser expectation of privacy for the students within the school envi-
ronment.44 
In Acton, the Supreme Court of the United States held that a student’s 
participation in school-sponsored sports programs was adequate on its own to 
warrant the school’s suspicionless, warrantless drug test of that student.45  
Although the Court “caution[ed] against the assumption that suspicionless 
drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts,” it also 
explicitly stated that “the most significant element [in deciding so in this case 
was] . . . that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the government’s 
responsibilities, under a public school system, as guardian and tutor of chil-
dren entrusted to its care.”46 
This concept was taken even further in Board of Education of Independ-
ent School District No. 92 of Pottawatomie County v. Earls, in which the 
Supreme Court held that suspicionless drug testing of students in all extracur-
ricular activities was “a reasonable means of furthering the School District’s 
important interest in preventing and deterring drug use among its schoolchil-
dren.”47  As the Court reasoned, “[S]tudents who participate in competitive  
 38. Id. at 318–19. 
 39. 515 U.S. 646, 664–65 (1995). 
 40. Id. at 664–65. 
 41. Id. at 652 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
 42. Id. at 654. 
 43. See id. 
 44. See id. at 654–55; see also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Potta-
watomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830 (2002); New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 
341–42 (1985). 
 45. Acton, 515 U.S. at 664–65. 
 46. Id. at 665. 
 47. 536 U.S. at 838. 
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extracurricular activities voluntarily subject themselves to many of the same 
intrusions on their privacy as do athletes” and should therefore be subject to 
the same lowered expectation of privacy.48  This supposed consent to intru-
sion allowed the Earls Court to extend the Acton doctrine even further.49 
The rulings in Acton and Earls laid the foundation for how lower courts 
analyzed suspicionless drug tests of students in all public schools: the greater 
the involvement of the student, the greater the school’s custodial responsibil-
ity.50  This increased custodial responsibility, in turn, created a lower expecta-
tion of privacy for those students, subsequently tipping the scales of reasona-
bleness in favor of the schools in these types of cases.51 
2.  The Character of the Intrusion 
The second factor that courts evaluate when deciding whether a suspi-
cionless drug test in a public school fits under the special needs doctrine is 
“the character of the intrusion imposed by the [drug-testing p]olicy.”52  Spe-
cifically, “the ‘degree of intrusion’ on one’s privacy caused by [carrying out 
the drug test] ‘depends upon the manner in which production of the [] sample 
is monitored.’”53  Although this factor will ultimately depend on the facts of 
each particular case, both the Acton and Earls Courts concluded that the inva-
sion of students’ privacy was insignificant in light of “the minimally intrusive 
nature of the sample collection and the limited uses to which the test results 
are put.”54  In Earls, “a faculty monitor wait[ed] outside [a] closed restroom 
stall for the student to produce a sample and [] listen[ed] for the normal 
sounds of urination in order to guard against tampered specimens and to in-
sure an accurate chain of custody.”55  Additionally, the test results were not 
turned over to any law enforcement authority and were used only for purpos-
es of limiting a failed student’s privilege of participating in extracurricular 
activities.56  The procedure followed by the school district in Acton was near-
ly identical to the one in Earls.57 
 
 48. Id. at 831–32. 
 49. See id. 
 50. See id.; see also Acton, 515 U.S. at 657. 
 51. See Earls, 536 U.S. at 832; Acton, 515 U.S. at 657. 
 52. Earls, 536 U.S. at 832 (citing Acton, 515 U.S. at 658). 
 53. Id. (quoting Acton, 515 U.S. at 658). 
 54. Id. at 834; Acton, 515 U.S. at 660. 
 55. Earls, 536 U.S. at 832. 
 56. Id. at 833. 
 57. In Acton, the school district’s policy required male students to produce sam-
ples at a urinal.  Acton, 515 U.S. at 658.  The students “remain[ed] fully clothed and 
[were] only observed from behind, if at all.”  Id.  Furthermore, the female students 
were required to “produce samples in an enclosed stall, with a female monitor stand-
ing outside listening only for sounds of tampering.”  Id.  Additionally, the tests in 
Acton looked only for “standard” drugs, and the test did not change depending on the 
identity of the student.  Id.  Equally important to the Acton Court, “the results of the 
7
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3.  Immediacy of Concern 
The final factor courts consider in these types of cases is the nature and 
immediacy of the government’s concerns.58  Once again, both the Acton and 
Earls Courts reached similar conclusions.59  The Court in Acton reasoned that 
“[d]eterring drug use by our Nation’s schoolchildren is at least as important 
as [deterring drug use in government employees who perform dangerous 
jobs].”60  The Acton Court was clear in its assertion that “[s]chool years are 
the time when the physical, psychological, and addictive effects of drugs are 
most severe” and that “[m]aturing nervous systems are more critically im-
paired by intoxicants than mature ones are.”61  While the nature and immedi-
acy of drug use by young school children is clearly seen as significant enough 
by the court, it is unclear if the same logic holds for older college-aged stu-
dents.  This distinction is particularly noteworthy in light of recent develop-
ments. 
III.  RECENT DEVELOPMENTS 
Linn State was the first public college in the country to implement a 
school-wide suspicionless drug-testing policy for all incoming students.62  
Therefore, in Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb – the lawsuit dealing with Linn 
State’s policy – the Eighth Circuit faced a matter of first impression.63  Prior 
to the enactment of Linn State’s policy, suspicionless drug-testing policies in 
colleges and universities had generally been limited to student-athletes.64   
tests [were] disclosed only to a limited class of school personnel who have a need to 
know; and they [were] not turned over to law enforcement authorities or used for any 
internal disciplinary function.”  Id.  In a fashion similar to the policy in Acton, the 
school district’s policy in Earls required “a faculty monitor [to] wait[] outside [a] 
closed restroom stall for the student to produce a sample.”  Earls, 536 U.S. at 832–33.  
The Earls opinion itself notes that “[the] procedure [used by Pottawatomie] is virtual-
ly identical to that reviewed in [Acton], except that it additionally protects privacy by 
allowing male students to produce their samples behind a closed stall.”  Id. 
 58. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 660. 
 59. See id. at 661; see also Earls, 536 U.S. at 834. 
 60. Acton, 515 U.S. at 661 (first citing Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 
489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989); and then citing Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 628 (1989)). 
 61. Id. (quoting Richard A. Hawley, The Bumpy Road to Drug-Free Schools, 72 
PHI DELTA KAPPAN 310, 314 (1990)). 
 62. Jeremy L. Kahn, Shedding Rights at the College Gate: How Suspicionless 
Mandatory Drug Testing of College Students Violates the Fourth Amendment, 67 U. 
MIAMI L. REV. 217, 217 (2012); see also Rachel Bloom, Pass a Drug Test Before You 
Can Pass a Class, ACLU: BLOG (Sept. 8, 2011, 5:05 PM), 
http://www.aclu.org/blog/criminal-law-reform/pass-drug-test-you-can-pass-class; 
Williams, supra note 3. 
 63. See 2 KEVIN B. ZEESE, DRUG TESTING LEGAL MANUAL § 8:7 (2d ed. 2016). 
 64. See id.; see also Kahn, supra note 62, at 233. 
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Therefore, the result of this case will have a significant impact on the future 
rights of college students.  Prior to Kittle-Aikeley, the circumstances under 
which college-aged students had been tested were extremely limited.65  The 
only notable instances of student drug testing happened at Liberty University 
and the University of Maryland.66 
A.  College Drug Testing Prior to Linn State 
In 1988, Liberty University, a private Christian school in southwestern 
Virginia, became the first college in the United States to implement a drug-
testing policy for non-athletes.67  Under its policy, Liberty required all stu-
dents to sign a waiver consenting to random tests.68  Those who refused were 
expelled.69  Although it was estimated that two-thirds of the student body 
were opposed, no litigation ensued because “testing by a private institution is 
legal if it is incorporated in the [wavier] agreement [that the] students sign.”70  
The school then tested about 200 students per month, most of whom were 
actually still chosen on the basis of some sort of probable cause.71 
Some public institutions, such as the University of Maryland, have insti-
tuted drug-testing policies as a disciplinary measure.72  At Maryland, any 
student previously found guilty of a drug-related offense becomes subject to 
periodic drug testing.73  While not suspicionless, this policy represents the 
most notable use of student drug testing at a public university to date.  Other 
public schools, such as the University of North Carolina, have actively reject-
ed any form of mandatory drug testing whatsoever.74  While student-athletes 
at North Carolina are subject to the standard NCAA drug-testing require-
ments, the university itself has declined to implement any separate policies of 
its own.75  The university, which had “substantial concerns regarding the con-
stitutionality and basic fairness of [a] mandatory program,” decided that even 
student-athletes “should be not singled out” by the school itself.76 
 
 65. See ZEESE, supra note 63, § 8:7; Kahn, supra note 62, at 233. 
 66. See ZEESE, supra note 63, § 8:7; Donald P. Baker, Liberty U. to Test for 
Drugs, WASH. POST (Apr. 24, 1988), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/local/1988/04/24/liberty-u-to-test-for-
drugs/8fe0daf5-e869-4f41-9bbb-6b778cc3fb28/. 
 67. ZEESE, supra note 63, § 8:7. 
 68. Baker, supra note 66. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. (emphasis added). 
 71. ZEESE, supra note 63, § 8:7. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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B.  Suspicionless Testing in Public Universities 
Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb dealt with the imposition of a mandatory, 
suspicionless drug-testing policy by Linn State Technical College.77  The 
Appellees – a group acting on behalf of current and future students of the 
college – sought a declaratory judgment that the school’s mandatory, school-
wide drug-testing policy was in violation of the Fourth Amendment.78 
The drug-testing policy was adopted in June 2011 for the purpose of 
“provid[ing] a safe, healthy and productive environment for everyone who 
learns and works at [the college] by detecting, preventing and deterring drug 
use and abuse among students.”79  Any student who refused to submit to the 
screening was subjected to “administrative or student-initiated withdrawal.”80  
Shortly after the testing began, the Appellees brought suit, claiming the poli-
cy was “facially unconstitutional” and sought an injunction prohibiting the 
school from carrying out the policy.81  It was the students’ belief that because 
the policy required neither a warrant nor probable cause, the tests were unrea-
sonable and thus violated the students’ Fourth Amendment right of protection 
against unreasonable searches and seizures.82  Both the U.S. District Court for 
the Western District of Missouri and the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Cir-
cuit have heard this case repeatedly.83  This case was initially filed in the U.S. 
District Court for the Western District of Missouri under the name Barrett v. 
Claycomb84 and assumed the title Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb after being re-
manded and appearing in front of the Eighth Circuit a second time.85  Most 
recently, the Eighth Circuit reheard the case en banc – vacating its panel deci- 
 77. 807 F.3d 913, 917 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated (Feb. 18, 2016). 
 78. Id. at 918. 
 79. Id. at 917.  The policy read as follows: “Linn State Technical College will 
begin a drug screening program in the fall semester of 2011 for students who are 
newly classified as degree or certificate seeking and degree or certificate seeking 
students returning after one or more semesters of non-enrollment at the Linn State 
Technical College campus or any Linn State Technical College location.”  Id. (quot-
ing Drug Screening, supra note 2). 
 80. Id. at 917–18.  Under the policy, “if a test returned positive, the student 
would have 45 days ‘to rescreen and test negative to remain enrolled.’”  Id. at 918 
(quoting Drug Screening, supra note 2).  It was estimated that “[a]pproximately 550 
students paid a $50 fee for the drug test that fall and were tested.”  Id.  The test results 
were not revealed to law enforcement personnel regardless of the outcome.  Id. at 
917. 
 81. Id. at 918. 
 82. See Brief of Appellees at 16, Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th 
Cir. 2015) (Nos. 13-3264, 14-1145), 2014 WL 2158892, at *16. 
 83. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 918–19.  See also Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 
315, 319–20 (8th Cir. 2013); Barrett v. Claycomb, No. 11-cv-04242-NKL, 2011 WL 
5827783, at *1 (W.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2011), order vacated, 705 F.3d 315 (8th Cir. 
2013). 
 84. Barrett, 2011 WL 5827783, at *1. 
 85. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d 913. 
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sion that reversed the district court’s permanent injunction – and affirmed the 
district court’s permanent injunction.86  This iteration of the case assumed the 
name Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong to reflect the name of the new President of Linn 
State, Shawn Strong.  The reinstatement is fresh, and it is unclear whether 
Linn State will appeal to the Supreme Court, leaving uncertainty in this area 
of the law. 
1.  Barrett and the Initial Ruling 
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Missouri first heard 
the case back in 2011 to determine whether a preliminary injunction was nec-
essary to cease testing.87  The district court not only found that the challeng-
ers met the “fair chance” of success standard necessary for the injunction, but 
it went even further in asserting the injunction would still be appropriate un-
der “the more rigorous ‘likely to prevail’ standard.”88  On interlocutory ap-
peal, the Eighth Circuit reversed the preliminary injunction.89  The case was 
subsequently remanded to the district court for a full proceeding.90 
When the Western District heard the case on remand, the challengers 
“clarified that they sought as-applied relief.”91  In order to analyze the drug-
testing policy as it was being applied, the district court conducted a program-
by-program investigation to “ensure that the category of students subject to 
the drug-testing policy [was not] defined more broadly than necessary to meet 
the policy’s purposes.”92 
 
 86. Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727, 731 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 87. Barrett, 2011 WL 5827783, at *1.  The number of students who were initial-
ly subject to drug testing was relatively insignificant.  See Barrett, 705 F.3d at 319.  
Approximately one week after Linn implemented the policy, the Western District 
granted a temporary restraining order, “enjoining any further testing of samples and 
any reporting of results to the school.”  Id. at 320.  A few months later, the court 
granted the full preliminary injunction discussed in this section.  Id. 
 88. Barrett, 705 F.3d at 320. 
 89. Id. at 325.  The Eighth Circuit overruled the preliminary injunction on the 
grounds that it was impossible “to hold that the drug-testing policy [was] unconstitu-
tional on its face in every conceivable circumstance.”  Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 918. 
 90. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 918 (citing Barrett, 705 F.3d at 320–21, 321 n.4, 
324–25).  The court “reiterate[ed] that in order to receive injunctive relief, no matter 
whether the court applied a ‘likelihood of success on the merits’ or a ‘fair chance of 
prevailing’ standard, the appellees could not satisfy their ultimate burden in mounting 
a facial challenge under the Fourth Amendment that no set of circumstances existed 
under which the policy would be valid.”  Id.  This is an interesting response to the 
district court’s assertion that the evidence was so overwhelmingly in favor of the 
Appellees that they would prevail even on a higher standard than what is required by 
the law. 
 91. See id. (discussing Barrett v. Claycomb, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Mo. 
2013)). 
 92. Barrett, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 1107.  See infra notes 97–98 and accompanying 
text for a complete list of the programs offered.  Linn State offers programs in a wide 
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In making a decision, the district court weighed the students’ expecta-
tion of privacy against Linn State’s special need to administer the test in order 
to assure a safe educational environment.93  The students who were enrolled 
in programs preparing them for professions in heavily regulated industries94 
were given a lower expectation of privacy.95  Students enrolled in all other 
programs were judged as having the typical privacy expectation adults gener-
ally enjoy.96  The district court ultimately held that drug testing was accepta-
ble for students enrolled in only some97 of Linn State’s many degree pro-
grams.98  Therefore, the mandatory school-wide policy was struck down as 
unconstitutional.99 
2.  The Vacated Opinion 
In the subsequent appeal, the Eighth Circuit once again reversed the dis-
trict court’s decision and reinstated the original drug-testing policy.100  The 
court stated that “the current matter is a hybrid of [] two [previously estab-
lished] lines of cases,[101] so while [the existing case law is] informative[, it 
is] not wholly dispositive and ultimately do[es] not alter the analysis that 
must be conducted” in each instance.102  In concluding that the original drug-
 
variety of specialty areas, each of which can be categorized into either the mechani-
cal, electrical, civil, or computer industry.  Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 917.  Most 
students take approximately 75 percent of their courses in their chosen field, and each 
program allows the student extensive hands-on experience.  Id. 
 93. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 919 (summarizing Barrett, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104). 
 94. A regulated industry is one that is “controlled by government rules.”  Regu-
lated Industry, CAMBRIDGE DICTIONARY, 
http://dictionary.cambridge.org/us/dictionary/english/regulated-industry (last visited 
Jan. 17, 2017). 
 95. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 919 (summarizing Barrett, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104). 
 96. See id. 
 97. Specifically, “the district court determined that Linn State could reasonably 
conduct drug testing in the following program areas: Aviation Maintenance, Industrial 
Electricity, Electrical Distribution Systems, Power Sports, and CAT Dealer Service 
Technician.”  Id. 
 98. Id.  Further, “the court held that it was unconstitutional for Linn State to drug 
test students participating in the following programs: Auto Body; Auto Mechanics; 
Heavy Equipment Technology; Medium/Heavy Truck Technology; Electronics Engi-
neering Technology; Electrical Power Generation; Heating, Ventilation and Air Con-
ditioning; Commercial Turf and Grounds Management, Machine Tool Technology; 
Computer Programming; Construction and Civil Technology; Networking Systems 
Technology; Design Drafting and the remainder of Linn State’s approximate twenty-
eight distinct academic programs.”  Id. 
 99. Id. 
 100. See generally id. 
 101. That is, those cases dealing with government employment and those dealing 
with public schools.  See id. at 920. 
 102. Id. at 920–21. 
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testing policy should be reinstated, the court pointed to four main considera-
tions behind its analysis: 
(1) the public has a valid interest in deterring drug use among students 
engaged in programs posing significant safety risks to others; (2) 
“some college students that attend Linn State have a diminished ex-
pectation of privacy because they are seeking accreditation in heavily 
regulated industries and industries where drug testing, in practice, is 
the norm[]”; (3) Linn State’s testing procedures significantly minimize 
the intrusiveness of Linn State’s drug-screening program and are rela-
tively noninvasive, thus the invasion of students’ privacy is not signif-
icant[]; and (4) the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm that 
can arise from a student under the influence of drugs while engaging 
in a safety-sensitive program provides the necessary immediacy for 
Linn State’s testing policy.103 
This court made it clear that while deterring drug use among students 
who pose a safety risk to others is an important concern, it is not the only 
concern.104  Most notably, deterring drug use among students who pose a 
safety risk to themselves also creates a significant special need.105 
The Eighth Circuit next claimed that the unique atmosphere at Linn 
State, alone, “establish[es] a special need sufficient to support the balancing 
of interests necessary in these circumstances.”106  Indeed, the court noted that 
“[u]sing drugs while attending classes at a technical school uniquely limited 
to instruction . . . where a large percentage of the students on campus are 
performing hands-on work . . . on a daily basis[] poses a unique safety risk 
that does not necessarily exist on other college campuses.”107  It was the 
court’s opinion that “[t]he very nature of these programs and the unique voca-
tional focus of the college itself involves dangerous aspects and creates safety 
risks [rising to the level of special need].”108  Therefore, rather than the pro-
gram-by-program approach used by the district court, the Eighth Circuit saw 
the nature of the school itself as sufficient to establish a blanket “special 
need” classification for the entire student body.109  
 103. Id. at 921 (internal citations omitted) (quoting Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 
315, 322 (8th Cir. 2013)). 
 104. Id. at 921–22. 
 105. Id. at 922.  To justify this need, the court pointed to Skinner, in which case 
“the Court acknowledged the axiomatic nature of the governmental interest in ensur-
ing the safety of the public ‘and of the employees themselves.’”  Id. (quoting Skinner 
v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 621 (2004)).  See also Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669–71 (recognizing that both the physical 
safety of border employees themselves and the safety of others are threatened by 
employees in an impaired state). 
 106. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 922. 
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 923. 
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In doing so, the Eighth Circuit used the three-part balancing test speci-
fied in both Acton and Earls.110  The court stated that the fact that “this case 
involves students is a key component of the privacy interest at stake although 
not determinative on its own.”111  The court recognized that the lowered ex-
pectation of privacy realized in both Acton and Earls “rel[ies] heavily on the 
tutelary aspect of our nation’s public schools, ‘permitting a degree of supervi-
sion and control that could not be exercised over free adults.’”112  However, 
even though “the privacy interests of college students in a public technical 
school are more akin to those we bestow upon individual adults,” the court 
still found that “Linn State certainly maintains a level of supervision appro-
priate for students in this particular college setting.”113 
Noting that the privacy interest here was a combination between that of 
an adult employed in a dangerous government job and that of a student in a 
more protected educational setting, the court decided that  “the expectation of 
privacy for all Linn State students is somewhat diminished as they are either 
entering into areas of instruction and future fields of employment in highly 
regulated and safety-sensitive positions; or they are juxtaposed with students 
who are doing so.”114  Therefore, the court found that “[Linn’s] unique envi-
ronment requires a heightened level of supervision and somewhat diminished 
expectation of privacy [for all the students].”115 
The second factor in the balancing test – the character of the intrusion – 
was only briefly mentioned in the opinion and found to be fulfilled.116  The 
court simply stated that compared to the policies prevalent in existing case 
law, “[t]he [drug-testing] procedures [used at Linn State] significantly mini-
mize the intrusiveness of Linn State’s drug-testing policy and the invasion of 
students’ privacy is not significant.”117 
Regarding the third factor – the immediacy of the harm – the court mir-
rored the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Acton and Earls, which both found a 
requisite need to drug test in order to prevent drug use among a school’s stu-
dent population.118  Although the demographics of the student body at Linn 
State are different from the student bodies discussed in Acton and Earls – the 
former comprised of college students and the latter two of high school stu-
dents – the Eighth Circuit deemed this difference insignificant in light of the 
 
 110. That is, the nature of the privacy interest, character of the intrusion, and na-
ture and immediacy of the harm.  See supra Part II.B. 
 111. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 924. 
 112. Id. (quoting Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 (1995)). 
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. (emphasis added). 
 115. Id. at 925. 
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. at 925–26.  See also Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawat-
omie Cty. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 834–35 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 
515 U.S. 646, 661 (1995). 
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government’s need to prevent drug use among the Linn State student popula-
tion.119 
Specifically in Kittle-Aikeley, the court pointed to studies establishing 
that  “[d]rug use has been found linked to . . . injuries and deaths, and . . . that 
the incidence of drug abuse and addiction on college campuses is steadily 
rising, which is particularly acute in a vocational setting where the programs 
involved have dangerous and safety-sensitive components.”120  Although 
these studies were clearly directed at “drug use . . . among our Nation’s 
young people,” the court was confident that “the problem [does not] abate[] 
the day after high school graduation” and thus avowed that “the data [were] 
certainly relevant to the instant discussion.”121  Taking this into account, the 
court concluded that “the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm that 
can arise from a student under the influence of drugs while engaging in a 
safety-sensitive program provides the necessary immediacy for Linn State’s 
testing policy.”122 
Because the immediacy of the harm outweighed the nature of the priva-
cy interest and character of the intrusion, the court held that the school-wide 
drug-testing policy instituted by Linn State adequately fell under the “special 
needs” exception to the warrant requirement and was therefore a reasonable 
search under the Fourth Amendment.123  Thus, the majority found that the 
district court erred by “permanently enjoining Linn State from administering 
its drug-testing program to students in specific, enumerated programs.”124 
3.  A Vocal Dissent 
The dissenting judge in this case believed that a permanent injunction 
from Linn State’s suspicionless drug-testing policy should have been granted 
for all but five of the academic programs available at the school.125  This con-
clusion was reached on the grounds that “Linn State ha[d] only met its burden 
of demonstrating a drug-related public safety concern for five academic pro-
grams” because when “public safety is not genuinely in jeopardy, the Fourth 
Amendment precludes the suspicionless search, no matter how conveniently 
arranged.”126  Because there are only five programs in which “a concrete risk 
of injury to others” exists, the dissent disagreed with the implementation of 
the policy for the remaining twenty-three programs.127  Nonetheless, tracking 
the majority opinion, the dissent walked through the Fourth Amendment 
 
 119. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 926. 
 120. Id. at 925–26 (first and second alterations in original). 
 121. Id. at 926. 
 122. Id. at 925. 
 123. See id. at 926. 
 124. Id. at 921. 
 125. Id. at 927 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
 126. Id. at 928 (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 323 (1997)). 
 127. Id. 
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analysis from a school-wide perspective128 in order to determine whether the 
policy – as upheld by the majority – was constitutional.129 
Using the same balancing test, the dissenting judge, Judge Bye, con-
cluded that the drug-testing program is unconstitutional.130  It is his belief that 
“adults have a strong Fourth Amendment privacy interest in being free from 
warrantless search and seizure,” and that “[t]he majority discount[ed] this 
position by attempting to analogize the privacy interests of high school stu-
dents as being consistent with the privacy interests of adult college stu-
dents.”131  Under this theory, “the mere possibility of cross enrollment be-
tween programs [should not be] enough evidence to justify drug testing for all 
students.”132  The dissent essentially argued it is age that creates the nature of 
the privacy interest rather than a person’s status as a student, and that college 
students have a greater expectation of privacy than those dealt with in Acton 
and Earls.133  Therefore, Judge Bye concluded that without substantial evi-
dence that extensive cross-enrollment into dangerous classes actually happens 
– which could create a public safety concern – there should be no diminished 
expectation of privacy for adult college students.134 
Additionally, the dissent found the character of the intrusion and the 
immediacy of the concern to be inadequate justifications under Earls and 
Acton.135  Judge Bye specifically took issue with Linn State’s “parental noti-
fication clause,” which would allow the school to share a student’s results 
with his or her parents.136  Furthermore, he accused the majority of using 
“fear-ridden rationale[s]” in order to justify an unconstitutional policy.137  He 
noted that Linn State has “successfully operated for fifty years before decid-
ing . . . that a drug-testing policy was essential for safeguarding its stu-
dents.”138  Consequently, it was Judge Bye’s belief that, while drug abuse is a 
serious problem, there was no evidence or specific event that created the im-
mediate interest necessary to invoke the special needs doctrine.139 
The vastly differing opinions held by not only the district court and the 
Eighth Circuit, but by the individual judges on the Eighth Circuit, shows the 
way the law handles a college student’s reasonable expectation of privacy is 
currently at a crossroad. 
 
 128. Essentially assuming (unwillingly) that Linn State had met its burden of 
proving special need.  Id. at 929. 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 931. 
 131. Id. at 929. 
 132. See id. 
 133. Id. 
 134. See id. at 929–30. 
 135. Id. at 930–31. 
 136. Id. at 930. 
 137. Id. (discussing the majority’s view on the massive drug problem in society). 
 138. Id. at 930–31. 
 139. Id. at 931. 
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4. The Rehearing – The Fragile State of the Law 
It should be of no surprise that shortly after it came to a decision, the 
Eighth Circuit’s panel opinion was vacated and reheard en banc.140  This 
time, the Eighth Circuit “affirm[ed] the district court’s order permanently 
enjoining Linn State from drug testing students ‘who were not, are not, or 
will not be enrolled’ in safety-sensitive programs.”141  In coming to this deci-
sion, the majority walked through a three-part “Special-Needs Analysis.”142 
First, the majority analyzed safety as a special need.  Here, the opinion 
focuses particularly on the Supreme Court’s rulings in Skinner and Von Raab.  
The majority noted that “[a]lthough the Supreme Court mentioned the safety 
of the individual employees [in those cases], the Court upheld the suspicion-
less drug testing in those cases based on the broader interests of public safety 
and security.”143  Therefore, the Strong majority concluded that the district 
court did not err in refusing to strike down Linn State’s drug testing policy 
“‘based on [the risk of harm to the individual students themselves]’ or . . . 
whether a particular program poses a significant safety risk to others.”144 
Next, the majority looked at whether fostering a drug-free environment 
could act as a special need.  In this section, the majority relied largely on 
Chandler, Acton, and Earls in holding that “Linn State has not demonstrated 
that fostering a drug-free environment is a special need.”145  The majority 
focused on the fact that, like in Chandler, “no crisis sparked the . . . decision 
to adopt the drug-testing policy,” and “Linn State does not believe it has a 
student drug-use problem greater than that experienced by other colleges.”146  
The majority noted that Chandler requires Linn State to “shore up an asser-
tion of special need,” yet Linn State’s claims in this case were made 
“[w]ithout any evidence.”147  Additionally, the majority found it “most signif-
icant[]” that, “[i]n contrast to [Acton] and Earls, . . . Linn State’s students are 
not children committed to the temporary custody of the state.”148  Thus, the 
Strong majority was clear that the state does not have the same magnitude of 
responsibility in preventing drug use here as it did in Acton and Earls.  Thus, 
with no evidence of “an ‘immediate crisis’” or unusually high drug use, cou-
pled with a lowered standard of responsibility, the majority concluded that 
 
 140. Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 141. Id. at 742 (quoting Barrett v. Claycomb, 976 F. Supp. 2d 1104, 1137 (W.D. 
Mo. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 
(8th Cir. 2015), and aff’d in part and rev’d in part en banc sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v. 
Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc)). 
 142. Id. at 736. 
 143. Id. at 737. 
 144. Id. at 737–38 (first alteration in original) (quoting Barrett, 976 F. Supp. 2d at 
1113). 
 145. Id. at 740. 
 146. Id. at 738. 
 147. Id. at 737–38. 
 148. Id. at 740. 
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the need to foster a drug-free environment was not sufficient to warrant sus-
picionless drug testing in this situation.149 
Finally, the majority evaluated the validity of the program-by-program 
analysis as applied by the district court.  Like the district court, the majority 
here “f[ound] unpersuasive Linn State’s argument that the possibility of 
cross-enrollment renders its drug-testing policy reasonable under the Fourth 
Amendment.”150  The majority noted that Linn State still has not provided 
any evidence that cross-enrollment actually poses an issue, and that “unsup-
ported assertions . . . are insufficient to justify the mandatory drug testing of 
all incoming students.”151  Therefore, the court held that the district court’s 
program-by-program analysis was properly applied.152 
Despite the decision to rehear the case, the dissent still held strong to the 
arguments made by the panel majority opinion that was vacated.  The dissent-
ing judges spent a large portion of their opinion reiterating nationwide drug 
use statistics.153  Citing to a Surgeon General Report, the Addiction and Re-
covery Act of 2016, and the U.S. Sentencing Commission Statistical Infor-
mation Packet for fiscal year 2015, the dissent articulated significant evidence 
of a general drug-use problem across the country.154  However, the dissent 
again provided no evidence of a drug problem at Linn State specifically.155  
Instead, the dissent asserted “the Supreme Court does not require specific 
evidence of drug use or abuse among those tested to support a drug-testing 
policy as that in place at Linn State.”156 
Additionally, the dissent argued that creating a safe school environment 
is Linn State’s job as opposed to the judicial system’s.  Essentially, it is the 
dissent’s belief that the school administrators are in a better position than a 
judge to make decisions impacting the safety of a school environment.157  
Accordingly, the dissent held that “the court should not, and cannot, operate 
as course-of-study-content experts discerning the relative safety issues arising 
from or around various programs, educational or otherwise, offered at a tech-
nical school where significant safety risks abound.”158 
 
 149. Id. at 739–40. 
 150. Id. at 741. 
 151. Id. at 742. 
 152. Id. 
 153. Id. at 743 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 154. Id. 
 155. Id. 
 156. Id. 
 157. Id. 
 158. Id. at 745.  Finally, the dissent took issue with the fact that “several lawyers 
associated with the ACLU spent several days on the Linn State campus attempting to 
recruit students to represent a Rule 23(b)(2) class opposing the testing,” and that “[i]t 
is now virtually certain that no named class plaintiff is any longer a student at Linn 
State.”  Id. at 744.  This led the dissent to conclude that “this litigation, as it is now 
positioned, could reasonably be captioned ACLU v. Linn State College.”  Id. 
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Strong is set to become an important precedent in future deliberations 
involving the privacy rights of college students.  As of now, it is unclear 
whether Linn State will continue to appeal its case.  As such, it is important to 
address the merit of the arguments being made by both sides. 
IV.  DISCUSSION 
In this litigation, the Eighth Circuit was faced with a decision of poten-
tially far-reaching significance for college students.  The legality of Linn 
State’s drug-testing policy should ultimately come down to the court’s “bal-
anc[ing] [of] the invasive nature of [the policy] against its benefit[] to socie-
ty.”159  This balancing act has been performed hundreds of times in courts all 
across the country.160  While Linn State’s drug-testing policy was far from the 
first to be challenged in court,161 the college context in which it took place 
raised novel questions.  There are several issues with the reasoning of the 
Strong dissent.  This Part attempts to shed light on the directions in which the 
law should proceed.  Additionally, this Part will delve into the potentially 
broad implications that could result from handling future cases in the mold of 
Linn State under the standards of Acton and Earls. 
A.  Lingering Concerns with Allowing Mandatory Drug Testing in Sit-
uations Like Linn State 
At the moment, it is unclear whether the issues brought in Strong will be 
heard again on appeal.  Additionally, this issue has not been raised in any 
other jurisdiction, and the rationales for both sides could potentially be seen 
as persuasive.  The reasoning suggested in the Eighth Circuit’s vacated panel 
opinion and repeated in the en banc dissent is troubling for several reasons.  
These erroneous rationales will be discussed in this Part. 
1.  Failure to “Shore Up” 
First, the manner in which the vacated panel opinion approached the 
special needs balancing test was concerning, particularly in its assessment of 
the strength of the government interest at hand.  While the en banc majority 
addressed this in part, this Part will delve deeper into the ramifications of 
such reasoning.  The focal point of the vacated panel majority’s argument 
 
 159. Stephen F. Brock et al., Drug Testing College Athletes: NCAA Does Thy Cup 
Runneth over?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 53, 56 (1994). 
 160. Id.  See, e.g., Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. 
v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 830–38 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 
646, 652–54 (1995). 
 161. See generally Brock et al., supra note 159, at 63–103 (discussing challenges 
made by college athletes subject to mandatory drug testing by the NCAA and univer-
sities). 
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was that the governmental interest in authorizing Linn State’s drug-testing 
policy outweighed both the students’ privacy interests and the character of the 
intrusion of the individual being tested.162  In finding so, the court asserted 
that “the need to prevent and deter the substantial harm that can arise from a 
student under the influence of drugs while engaging in a safety-sensitive pro-
gram provides the necessary immediacy for Linn State’s testing policy.”163 
In reality, the government failed to put forth significant evidence of an 
immediate need.  The only support for the government’s immediacy theory 
was that “proponents [of the new drug policy have spoken of] research 
[showing] that [d]rug use [is] linked to . . . injuries and deaths,” and that, in 
general, “the incidence of drug abuse and addiction on college campuses is 
steadily rising.”164  The research alluded to, whose source was unclear from 
the opinion, was non-specific to Linn State.165  In fact, the evidence demon-
strates no more of an immediate government interest in drug testing at Linn 
State than it does any other university in the country.166 
The dissent in the Eighth Circuit’s en banc opinion continued to cling to 
the notion that an analysis of whether there is a special need for suspicionless 
drug testing “does not require specific evidence of drug use . . . among those 
tested.”167  Instead, the dissent asserted that “a drug use comparable to other 
public colleges in America today almost certainly presents Linn State’s gov-
erning apparatus and its executive administrators with substantial health, 
safety and, security problems, all of which are specifically ameliorated by the 
College’s well-conceived drug-testing and screening program.”168 
While the court’s belief that “drug abuse is one of the most serious prob-
lems confronting our society today” may hold merit, nonetheless, the fact that 
a general governmental interest exists does not necessarily mean that the in-
terest will outweigh the other side of the balancing test in each circum-
stance.169 
In Earls, the Supreme Court was clear that “‘[while a] demonstrated 
problem of drug abuse . . . [is] not in all cases necessary to the validity of a 
testing regime,’ [it is necessary that] some showing does ‘shore up an asser-
 
 162. Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated (Fe. 
18, 2016). 
 163. Id. (emphasis added). 
 164. Id. at 925–26 (third and fifth alterations in original) (emphasis added) (inter-
nal quotation marks omitted). 
 165. Id. 
 166. See id. at 931 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Despite asserting the immediate necessi-
ty of the drug-testing policy, neither Linn State nor the majority cites any specific 
events or studies applicable to Linn State . . . .”). 
 167. Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727, 743 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Beam, 
J., concurring and dissenting). 
 168. Id. 
 169. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 926. 
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tion of special need for a suspicionless general search program.’”170  There-
fore, for Linn State’s policy to be valid, there must actually be evidence that 
the government’s interest in testing is greater than the privacy interests of the 
students. 
It appears that the vacated panel decision and en banc dissent side-
stepped this requirement.  Instead of putting forth real evidence that the gov-
ernment interest outweighed the privacy interest, both chose to simply estab-
lish the governmental interest’s existence and accept that as sufficient.171  Just 
because a governmental interest exists should not be an adequate substitute 
for showing that the governmental interest outweighs the students’ privacy 
concerns.  Unlike in Earls, Linn State failed to “shore up” its assertion for a 
special need.172 
2.  Reliance on an Ambiguous “Juxtaposition” Criterion 
Finally, to justify a lower expectation of privacy, the vacated panel opin-
ion also relied on the premise that every student enrolled at the university is 
either participating in “safety-sensitive positions” that warrant testing or is 
“juxtaposed” with students who are.173  However, the term juxtaposed174 has 
no apparent meaning in this context.  The court provided an inadequate ex-
planation for how such “juxtaposition” exists and why this juxtaposition of 
students would warrant suspicionless drug testing of an entire student body.  
The en banc dissent appears to justify this rationale on the grounds that hard 
evidence of crossover is not necessary here because a special needs analysis 
“actually demands a high order of generality in the matter of permitting test-
ing.”175 
Linn State offers twenty-eight different programs, ranging from com-
puter science to heavy equipment maintenance.176   It was not disputed that 
suspicionless drug testing for students enrolled in certain inherently danger-
ous programs, such as industrial electricity, was perfectly acceptable under 
the special needs doctrine.177  However, just because a student is enrolled at 
 
 170. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawatomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 835 (2002) (quoting Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 319 (1997)). 
 171. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 926; Strong, 844 F.3d at 745–46 (Beam, J., 
concurring and dissenting).  
 172. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 928 (Bye, J., dissenting). 
 173. Id. at 924 (majority opinion) (emphasis added). 
 174. Juxtaposed means “to place (different things) together in order to create an 
interesting effect or to show how they are the same or different.”  Juxtapose, 
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/juxtapose (last 
visited Jan. 18, 2017). 
 175. Strong, 844 F.3d at 747 (Beam, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 176. See supra notes 97–98 and accompanying text. 
 177. See Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 928 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Linn State had the 
burden of establishing its academic programs posed a genuine public safety risk.  
Linn State met this burden for five academic programs because it demonstrated the 
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the same institution as someone participating in dangerous activities does not 
mean that student should have a lower expectation of privacy.  While there is 
bound to be some cross-enrollment between programs at any university, there 
was no proof offered by the court that cross-enrollment into dangerous clas-
ses happens at any significant rate at Linn State.178  The vacated panel majori-
ty merely noted that the chance of cross-enrollment exists, without putting 
forth any evidence that it actually happens.179  Therefore, the court could only 
mean one of two things when it referenced the juxtaposition of students be-
tween majors: either that only the possibility of cross-enrollment exists or 
simply that students attending class in a geographically proximate area to one 
another is sufficient on its own.  Under either interpretation, the reasoning is 
inadequate. 
Under the Linn State drug-testing policy, the students who do not partic-
ipate in the dangerous programs have a lowered expectation of privacy – ei-
ther because those students have the theoretical opportunity to participate in 
the dangerous activities or because they are near those who already do.180  It 
is not a stretch to see how either of these rationales could be applied to count-
less situations beyond this case.  If opportunity and proximity were the signif-
icant factors in gauging the expectation of privacy, anyone who works or 
goes to school in the vicinity of someone who participates in dangerous activ-
ities (or could possibly participate himself or herself) could be susceptible to 
the same lowered expectations of that individual.  A student’s constitutional 
rights cannot be abridged solely because of the classwork of another student 
nearby.  Any further application of this rationale would create a significant 
danger to everyone’s Fourth Amendment rights. 
Instead, the burden should be on Linn State to track who is cross-
enrolling in classes that involve dangerous activities and test only those stu-
dents.  In a school of fewer than 1500 students, simply keeping track of those 
who are enrolled in dangerous classes and only testing those students would 
constitute an eminently more reasonable policy than depriving every student 
of his or her Fourth Amendment rights.  Thankfully, the Eighth Circuit took 
the opportunity to remedy this with its en banc decision. 
 
particular program presented a concrete risk of injury to others in the vicinity or simp-
ly that drug testing was the industry norm.”); see also Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. 
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669–71 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Execs.’ Ass’n, 489 
U.S. 602, 620–21 (1989). 
 178. Kittle-Aikeley, 807 F.3d at 930 (Bye, J., dissenting) (“Linn State did not meet 
its burden of proof and the mere possibility of cross enrollment is insufficient to justi-
fy a Fourth Amendment exception.”). 
 179. The majority states the fact that students do not go to class “in a vacuum” as 
its only evidence of cross-enrollment.  Id. at 925 (majority opinion).  This does noth-
ing to actually prove cross-enrollment’s existence.  The en banc dissent did not men-
tion cross-enrollment. 
 180. Id. at 924. 
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B.  What Now?  The Implications of Treating College Students Under 
an Acton Standard of Reasonable Expectation 
It is well established that the government needs a warrant and probable 
cause to administer a drug test to an adult unless that adult is a government 
worker whose job involves an element of danger to himself or others.181  It is 
also recognized that high school students who participate in sports or other 
extracurricular activities are susceptible to a lowered expectation of priva-
cy.182  However, it is still unclear how the law should treat public college 
students who seem to fall somewhere between typical working adults and 
high school students. 
Decisions such as Acton and Earls – the cornerstones of the law in the 
context of public schools – both heavily rely on the custodial relationship that 
a high school has with its students, and it is this relationship that provides the 
basis of the students’ lowered expectation of privacy.183  Despite a school’s 
additional responsibility in this context, judges initially granted the ability to 
use suspicionless drug tests very hesitantly.184  Not only did the Acton majori-
ty feel the need to distinguish between the typical high school student’s ex-
pectation of privacy and that of the general public, but it also felt the need to 
distinguish between the students in question – student athletes – and others 
enrolled at the same school.185  The Acton Court alleged that athletes were the 
“leaders of the drug culture” and cited factors such as pre-existing regulation 
and the increased risk of injury to justify such lowered expectations.186  These 
sorts of concerns do not generally exist for college students.187 
Further, the Earls Court justified its extension of the Acton rule on the 
grounds that students participating in extracurricular activities “subject them-
selves to many of the same intrusions on their privacy as do athletes.”188  
These intrusions include off-campus travel, communal undress, and the exist-
ence of other rules and requirements that do not apply to the student popula-
tion as a whole.189  Once again, these factors do not apply to the typical col-
lege student, and any attempt to stretch these rulings to cover such individuals 
would be improper. 
 
 181. See generally Skinner, 489 U.S. 602; Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656. 
 182. Bd. of Educ. of Indep. Sch. Dist. No. 92 of Pottawtomie Cty. v. Earls, 536 
U.S. 822, 831–32 (2002); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 655 
(1995). 
 183. See generally Earls, 536 U.S. at 822; Acton, 515 U.S. at 646. 
 184. See Acton, 515 U.S. at 665 (“We caution against the assumption that suspi-
cionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other contexts.”). 
 185. Id. at 657, 664–65. 
 186. Id. at 649. 
 187. See Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913, 929 (8th Cir. 2015) (Bye, J., 
dissenting), vacated (Feb. 18, 2016). 
 188. Earls, 536 U.S. at 831. 
 189. Id. at 831–32. 
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The Supreme Court of the United States actually made this point in the 
Acton majority opinion, noting that “[it] caution[ed] against the assumption 
that suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in other 
contexts.”190  The Court stated that “[t]he most significant element [in its de-
cision was] . . . that the Policy was undertaken in furtherance of the govern-
ment’s responsibilities . . . as guardian and tutor of children entrusted to its 
care.”191  This focal point of the Court’s stance does not apply to college stu-
dents in the same fashion.  Few college students would consider their college 
or university to have guardian or tutelary responsibility over them.  Unlike a 
high school, which treats students as dependents, a college or university has 
comparatively little custodial responsibility.192  As such, analysis of a college 
drug-testing policy should – as the dissent in the vacated panel decision noted 
– follow more closely those cases dealing with on-the-job, government em-
ployment drug-testing policies such as those implemented in Skinner, Von 
Raab, and Chandler.  In reality, the experience of college students is much 
more similar to that of the government employee, and the rules governing 
their Fourth Amendment rights should parallel those of government employ-
ees. 
Therefore, like in the government employment cases, the main factor in 
deciding the constitutionality of a college’s suspicionless drug-testing policy 
should be whether the students “perform high risk, safety-sensitive tasks.”193  
Like the adults in Chandler, the special needs exception should not apply to 
college students unless there is an “indication of a concrete danger demand-
ing departure from the Fourth Amendment’s main rule.”194  Most college 
students are not subject to such dangers any more than a typical adult is.  
Because of this, most college students deserve the same privacy rights as a 
typical adult. 
The special needs exception must be handled with care.  Applying the 
holdings of Acton and Earls to college students could have sent the law down 
a slippery slope.  The warrant and probable cause requirements are necessary 
aspects of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.195  The special needs exception 
was originally intended to apply only in situations in which it was absolutely 
necessary to fulfill a compelling purpose.196 
 
 190. Acton, 515 U.S. at 665. 
 191. Id. (emphasis added). 
 192. See id. at 656–57 (describing the custodial responsibility of a high school). 
 193. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 321–22 (1997); see also Nat’l Treasury 
Emps. Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 669–71 (1989); Skinner v. Ry. Labor Ex-
ecs.’ Ass’n, 489 U.S. 602, 620–21 (1989). 
 194. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319. 
 195. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 196. There is an argument to be made that the Fourth Amendment was never even 
intended to provide an answer to the problems caused by random drug testing in the 
first place.  David E. Steinberg, High School Drug Testing and the Original Under-
standing of the Fourth Amendment, 30 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 263, 264 (2003) (“The 
framers sought to proscribe physical searches of residences pursuant to a general 
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It is hard to fathom that an individual’s status as a college student in and 
of itself – when there is no reason to believe that there is a drug problem to 
begin with – is a compelling enough reason to disregard a constitutional right.  
Extending the special needs doctrine to cover the kinds of situations dealt 
with in Linn State’s case would have risked allowing the exception to swal-
low the rule.  If the court were willing to extend the scope of the special 
needs exception to cover the average college student, extending it to all adults 
would not be an inconceivable extension.197 
The Supreme Court of the United States has only struck down a suspi-
cionless drug test under the special needs doctrine a single time.198  Several 
scholars fear that “[i]t is only a small stretch of logic to apply the . . . ra-
tionale [currently being used by the courts] to condone a law that required 
suspicionless drug testing [of everyday activities].”199  What should be re-
quired in order to designate a special need is a truly “substantial” need.  Rein-
stating the Western District opinion appears to reinforce this belief. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
For the first time, a public college within the United States instituted a 
mandatory drug testing policy for all incoming students.200  The manner in 
which the courts handled this case represents a crossroad for the Fourth 
Amendment as it is applied to college students.  The state of the law appears 
to be fragile, as the Western District of Missouri and Eighth Circuit were at 
one time unable to agree on how to evaluate the case, and the Eighth Circuit 
itself disagreed internally to the extent that it reheard Linn State’s case en 
 
warrant, or without any warrant at all.  The Fourth Amendment simply never was 
intended to govern the issues raised by random drug tests.”). 
 197. See id. 
 198. See Chandler, 520 U.S. 305 (evaluating a Georgia law requiring all candi-
dates for certain state-wide elected offices to certify that they had passed the drug test 
that was challenged).  According to Jennifer E. Smiley, this “represents the first, and 
thus far the only, time that the Supreme Court has struck down a suspicionless drug-
testing policy under the auspices of the special needs doctrine.”  Jennifer E. Smiley, 
Rethinking the “Special Needs” Doctrine: Suspicionless Drug Testing of High School 
Students and the Narrowing of Fourth Amendment Protections, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 
811, 824 (2001).  See also Steinberg, supra note 196, at 270–71 (“The Fourth 
Amendment was conceived to serve a single, specific purpose – to prevent the physi-
cal search of residences without a warrant, or pursuant to a general warrant.  Courts 
may attempt to develop a coherent regulation of random drug tests based on the 
Fourth Amendment, but such attempts are doomed to failure.  The Fourth Amend-
ment never was intended to govern such controversies.  With respect to the validity of 
random drug tests in the public schools, the Fourth Amendment says nothing at all.”). 
 199. See, e.g., Smiley, supra note 198, at 838.  One example is the drug testing of 
automobile drivers involved in car accidents, “a step which at least one state has al-
ready taken.”  Id. at 838–39. 
 200. Bloom, supra note 62. 
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banc.201  The Eighth Circuit has most recently reinstated the Western Dis-
trict’s holding in favor of the Linn State student body.  This is hopefully an 
indication that the courts believe that college drug-testing policies should be 
analyzed in the same manner as policies within the government employment 
context.  College students’ reasonable expectations of privacy should mirror 
those of adults – not high school students.  
 
 201. See Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2015), vacated (Feb. 
18, 2016); Barrett v. Claycomb, 705 F.3d 315 (8th Cir. 2013); Barrett v. Claycomb, 
976 F. Supp. 2d 1104 (W.D. Mo. 2013), rev’d and remanded sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley 
v. Claycomb, 807 F.3d 913 (8th Cir. 2015), and aff’d in part and rev’d in part en 
banc sub nom. Kittle-Aikeley v. Strong, 844 F.3d 727 (8th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  See 
also Kittle-Aikeley v. Claycomb, Nos. 13-3264, 14-1145, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 
2843 (8th Cir. 2016). 
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